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What’s Transmitted?  Inherited Information. 
Nicholas Shea 
 
1 Introduction 
In response to worries that uses of the concept of information in biology are metaphorical or 
insubstantial, Bergstrom & Rosvall (B&R) have identified a sense in which DNA transmits 
information down the generations.  Their ‘transmission view of information’ is founded on a 
claim about DNA’s teleofunction. 
 Sterelny et al. (1996) and Maynard Smith (2000) were the first to argue that genetic 
information should be understood in terms of teleofunctions, leading to a sense in which genes 
carry semantic information, with conditions of correctness or satisfaction.  In Shea (2007a) I 
argued that a modified teleosemantic account could be sustained in the face of various 
objections to these views.  The account has two key elements.  First, semantic content comes 
into view only when we see DNA as carrying messages between generations, rather than 
sending messages during the course of individual development.  Second, we need to be clear 
that there is a consumer of these messages.  I argued that there is a real consumer: the process 
of development takes zygotic DNA as input and produces phenotypic traits as output – 
bracketing the intricacies of the actual processes of individual development.  The message 
carried by DNA down the generations can only be discerned by considering the way that genes 
are designed to be consumed. 
 Bergstrom and Rosvall’s (B&R) focus on transmission properties of DNA is a significant 
advance.  They agree with the first point from Shea (2007a) about transmission down the 
generations, but not the second, because they see their transmission view of information as a 
rival to semantic accounts.  This commentary argues that it is complementary.  The idea that 
DNA is transmitting information down the generations only makes sense if it is carrying a 
message, that is to say if it has semantic content.  Section 2 below argues that B&R’s 
transmission view needs to be supplemented with a sense in which DNA carries semantic 
information.  But the account in Shea (2007a) also needs the insights B&R bring, because it is 
based on the claim that DNA has the function of carrying information down the generations.  
By showing that DNA is adapted to playing the role of a Shannon-type communications 
channel, B&R offer a strong argument that DNA really does have that biological function.  
Furthermore, by taking the perspective of a communications engineer, B&R offer novel insights 
into the way evolution has designed the DNA-based inheritance system to operate.  Section 3 
goes on to address the objection that there is no real consumer of zygotic DNA of the sort that 
would underpin teleosemantic contents. 
2 Semantic Contents 
Critics of genetic information claim that genes and other developmental factors are on a par in 
carrying information (Griffiths & Gray 1994, Griffiths 2001, p. 398).  B&R’s answer is that 
only elements on which natural selection acts constitute an information channel – only those 
which are the basis of heritable variation [p. 5].  Such elements will thereby have 
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teleofunctions.  In fact, when they come to define transmission information, B&R make a 
significant further restriction.  Only a factor X which has a very particular teleofunction, ‘to 
reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes 
X’, carries transmission information.1 
 I agree that some such metafunction is needed to vindicate the existence of substantive 
genetic information.  But, even if we read ‘agent’ in a very thin sense, B&R’s formulation 
invites the question: about what is the agent’s uncertainty reduced?  B&R rightly argue that we 
don’t need to know what DNA represents in order to be able to see that it transmits 
information.2  We can infer that from evidence that DNA is adapted to functioning as a 
communications channel.  But DNA could only have the metafunction B&R specify if there is a 
message that it carries, which presupposes that there is a sense in which DNA genuinely does 
carry semantic information. 
 B&R do seem to accept that there is a message in the genome, and that it concerns 
phenotypic features of the organism: 
we know that genes are transmitted from parent to offspring in order to provide the 
offspring with information about how to make a living (e.g. metabolize sugars, create 
cell walls, etc.) in the world. [p. 4] 
 So there is a functional message about ‘how to make a living’.  There is a real puzzle 
about how natural selection could have adapted DNA to this transmission role.  Does it require 
controversial lineage-based selection?  Or can it be accounted for by the long-run fitness 
benefits of improved transmission fidelity, with the short-run fitness costs of improvements in 
fidelity being zero or very small (as I have suggested: Shea 2007a, p. 323, Shea 2009, p. 2432)?  
Despite these uncertainties, the evidence is strong that DNA has been adapted to a transmission 
role, so that it does have the evolutionary function of transmitting heritable phenotypes down 
the generations.  B&R point to six lines of evidence in support:- 
(i)  it stores and transmits an arbitrary sequence 
(ii) a long sequence is stored in a small space 
(iii)  the sequence is indefinitely extensible 
(iv) the sequence is inert and structurally stable 
(v) the sequence is very easy to replicate 
                                                       
1  It seems that B&R intend this to be a necessary condition as well. 
2  Following de Ruyter van Steveninck et al. (1997), B&R observe that calculating how much 
information is being carried does not depend upon knowing what the message is.  However, it 
does require that you know what the semantically-significant coding elements are (the syntax, 
not the semantics, roughly).  For example, de Ruyter van Steveninck et al. assumed that rate 
coding, rather than phase coding, say, was the bearer of relevant messages in the fly’s 
neurobiology. 
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(vi) the mapping from codon triplets to amino acids is optimised by reference to 
facts about how it is transmitted, by comparison to randomly-generated 
mappings 
 
The mapping is optimised with respect to transmission errors in two ways.  Firstly, simple 
translational errors generate the same amino acid, or an amino acid which is similar in an 
important chemical property, its affinity for water (and in its polar requirement, which is 
closely related) – although similarity in other chemical properties is not optimised (molecular 
volume and isoelectric point).  Secondly, the mapping is optimised to the errors that are more 
common, given observed biases in rates of point mutation and in mistranslation. 
 Since features (i) to (vi) are not restricted to multicellular organisms, they cannot be 
explained away as adaptations for somatic cell inheritance.  The conjunction of these features is 
good evidence that DNA has been adapted to serve as a channel for communicating information 
down the generations.  They increase fidelity, so that useful adaptations are preserved.  Feature 
(vi) also aids evolvability by smoothing the mutational landscape, making it more likely that 
common mutations lead to phenotypes that are nearby in the space of phenotypic possibility.  I 
will argue that features (i) and (vi) do not just concern the transmission of the sequence itself, 
but also depend on the sequence carrying semantic information. 
 At first pass, arbitrariness (i) and optimisation (vi) seem to be in tension: optimisation 
implies that the code is anything but arbitrary.  Rather, it is a one-in-a-million solution to the 
communication problem.  Indeed, arbitrariness itself is a puzzling concept, since in any multi-
stage causal process, an intermediate could be replaced by an alternative, provided the there are 
compensating changes in the way it is produced and acted upon.  To take one example, the 
relation between the direction of the honeybee’s nectar dance and the direction of nectar 
appears to be systematic, not arbitrary, but the system could work just as well with a different 
relation, provided the behaviour of producers and consumers were adjusted in corresponding 
ways. 
 The literature on costly signalling indicates a better way to think about arbitrariness. It 
is not a categorical property, but a matter of degree, depending upon the costs associated with 
moving to a different signal.  Some female frogs use the pitch of male frog sounds as a proxy for 
size, hence fitness.  That signal is relatively non-arbitrary because there would be a very high 
cost for a small frog to produce large vocal apparatus.  Correlatively, the arbitrariness of the 
genetic code pointed to at (i) lies in the fact that there is little difference in cost between 
different ways of setting up the mapping between codon triplets and amino acids.  As a result, 
the code is arbitrary with respect to its message about phenotypic properties.  If the message 
were just the sequence itself, then the code would not be arbitrary. 
 The tension between arbitrariness and optimisation is resolved when we see that 
arbitrariness consists in the fact that costs to the developing individual are largely independent 
of how the triplet-amino acid map is set up.  That is what allows the mapping which is chosen 
to be optimised in the light of common errors due to point mutations.  It is from the point of 
view of the problem of keeping that mapping stable over evolutionary time that we see that 
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different mappings have different costs, because of the distribution of errors introduced as the 
message is transmitted down the generations.3 
 Notice that the non-arbitrariness in (vi) is dependent on the content of the message 
being sent.  The smoothness of the mutational landscape is specified with respect to chemical 
properties of amino acids for which DNA codes.  Chemical similarity will tend to lead to 
proteins with similar physiological, hence phenotypic effects.  That is optimization with respect 
to a presumed message.  So both these lines of evidence that DNA is adapted to an 
informational function depend upon assumptions about what DNA is coding for, and so on the 
assumption that it has semantic content. 
 Finally, B&R’s argument about the directionality of transmission relies on an 
assumption about what is coded.  They argue that the data processing inequality reveals the 
directional flow of Shannon information.  When there are correlations between a random 
variable X measured by a sender and another random variable Y, measured by a receiver, then 
the mutual information between X and Y is symmetric: each carries the same amount of 
information about the other ( I(X ; Y) = I(Y ; X) ).  Asymmetry arises, according to B&R, 
when the message Y concerns some feature of the external world W with which the variable 
observed by the sender itself correlates.  For then the data processing inequality ensures 
I(W ; X) ≥ I(W ; Y).  That asymmetry only arises if the content of the message is some further 
property of the world.  If the function of the DNA sequence were just to reduce the uncertainty 
on the part of an agent about sequence properties themselves, then we would be back to the 
symmetry of mutual information.  B&R’s prescient observation about the directionality of the 
flow of genetic information is surely right, but it relies on DNA carrying semantic information 
about something other than its own sequence properties. 
3 Consumers 
One prominent argument against genes carrying semantic contents accepts that teleosemantics 
would deliver such contents if DNA had a genuine representation consumer.  The objection is 
that in reality there is no such consumer (Godfrey-Smith 2007).  B&R emphasise that their 
transmission information flows down generations, orthogonally to the processes going on in 
individual development, and caution against focusing on ‘how information goes from an 
encoded form in the genotype to its expression in the phenotype’ [p. 4].  The absence of any 
real consumer would undermine the teleosemantic approach and thus support B&R’s attempt 
to give a semantics-free account of the information transmitted by DNA down the generations.  
This section answers the objection about consumers by taking a difficult case: single-celled 
bacteria.  I argue that even there, in the absence of a clear distinction between zygote and 
organism, there really are consumers of the message carried by DNA. 
                                                       
3  That is an idealisation, since the code is also optimised by reference to errors that occur in 
individual development (e.g. frame-shift errors, ribosome “traffic congestion”).  Such 
optimisation is only possible because, in every other way, the two synonymous codons impose 
very similar developmental costs. 
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 Both B&R and Shea (2007a) rely on a division between the genetic inheritance channel 
and the developing organism.  It is harder to spot the channel in the case of bacteria, since the 
germ-line DNA continues to play an active role in the metabolic activity of the organism 
throughout its lifetime.  If the organism (bacterium) is the consumer of genetic information, the 
message itself (DNA) looks to be a substantial part of the consumer.  A second problem is to 
make a distinction between producer and consumer of the genetic message, since in bacterial cell 
division it may be unclear which of the two resulting cells is the mother and which is the 
daughter. 
 The first problem is to distinguish the consumer from the message.  Granted, 
eukaryotes have much more complex developmental programmes than prokaryotes.  So it is 
more obvious in eukaryotes that the DNA is being read so as to guide development, rather than 
just playing a stable, but essentially physiological / metabolic role in the activity of the cell.  But 
in bacteria there is still a fundamental asymmetry.  Changes in DNA will have downstream 
effects far into the future, if they are viable at all.  Viable changes in other cellular factors have 
much more short term effects.  Further, DNA plausibly has the teleofunction of playing this 
role.  The evidence about DNA’s informational metafunction highlighted by B&R is equally 
applicable to bacteria.  So the DNA is the message and the rest of the organism is the consumer.  
The message sent by DNA continues to be consumed during the lifetime of the organism, but 
that does not undermine a distinction between message and consumer.  If other factors, like 
chromatin marking, also have the function of passing on heritable phenotypes, then there will 
be other channels of inheritance.  But that is a demanding test, so there is no threat that most of 
the bacterium will end up counting as message.  There is a clear distinction between message 
and consumer, and much of the organism constitutes the consumer. 
 A further peculiarity in bacteria is that two copies of the DNA are made before the cell 
has divided; indeed, those copies will have begun the duplication process again before the cell 
walls have been sealed around the first division (Lau et al. 2003).  Here, B&R’s observation that 
data storage and data transmission are mathematically equivalent comes in handy.  Both initial 
duplication of the DNA, and stable preservation of those duplicates in the cell, are part of the 
process of transmitting genetic information to offspring cells.  If we need to identify a point 
when consumption begins anew, it is the moment when the dividing cell wall closes to make 
two cells.  That is the point when the metabolic activity of the two cells is separated so as to 
create two organisms.  There will be fuzzy boundaries here too of course, but the difference 
between one organism and two organisms is an uncontroversial distinction that is relied on for 
lots of purposes in biology.  The account of inherited information has no need to postulate extra 
biological properties that have not previously been recognised as significant.  When the cell has 
divided, a new consumer comes into existence, and the message carried by the genome begins 
to be read by that new organism. 
 A final problem is to say, in bacteria, which of the two resulting cells is the producer 
and which is the consumer.  It may be possible to distinguish between mother and daughter in 
bacterial cell division (Stewart et al. 2005), in which case the mother is the producer of the 
message, which gets passed to the daughter cell and begins to be consumed when the daughter 
cell is formed.  Even if there is no asymmetry, we could just treat one cell as mother and the 
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other as daughter.  But it might be better, given the symmetry of the situation, to see two new 
cells being formed out of the original, so that the parent cell sends two DNA messages, one to 
each of the new cells which are formed.  If so, there would be two new consumers, in addition 
to the parent producer of the message. 
 It may not matter which way we go.  Indeed, although teleosemantics relies on there 
being genuine consumers whose reality is independent of semantic facts, it is not clear that it 
needs there to be well-defined producers.  Infotel semantics adds to teleosemantics the 
additional requirement that the message should carry correlational information (Shea 2007b), 
but it does not require there to be a mechanism which has the function of producing that 
correlation.  In the case of genetic information, it is the process of natural selection that 
generates correlational information in the genome. So there is no need to view individual 
organisms as producers.  The problem of differentiating producer from consumer when a 
bacterium divides just does not arise.  The whole process is well-characterised in terms of 
natural selection giving rise to information over phylogenetic time, read in ontogenetic time by 
a series of the organisms, which are the consumers of the message carried by DNA.  That is 
exactly the framework relied on by B&R and illustrated in their figure 4 – but it does not 
dispose of the notion of consumers.  The idea that individual organisms merely reacting to DNA 
are consumers remains critical to the claim that DNA carries semantic information. 
4 Conclusion 
B&R’s transmission view of information depends on there being a sense in which semantic 
information is carried by the genome, because they rely on DNA’s carrying a content or 
message.  So the inherited information of Shea (2007a) is complementary to B&R’s 
transmission view of information, not a rival.  Correlatively, the several strands of B&R’s 
ingenious paper serve significantly to strengthen the case for the existence of substantive genetic 
information, underpinned by DNA’s teleofunctions.  An important worry about teleosemantic 
accounts of semantic information in the genome is their reliance on the reality of information 
consumers.  However, even in the difficult case of bacteria the reality of DNA consumers has a 
biological basis which is independent of debates about genetic information. 
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